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Before 1789, the individual colonies that would ultimately make up the United States were free to issue their own currencies, and all of them did. 1 The U.S. Constitution, adopted in 1789, took this power away from the individual states. Thus, it might appear that the Constitution left the federal government, which minted gold and silver coins, as the sole potential creator of currency in the new country.
However, this did not turn out to be the case. Although the Constitution took away the power of states to issue money, it left them with the power to charter and regulate note-issuing banks. All of the states ultimately utilized this power, and some went as far as wholly or partially owning banks. In addition, the federal government chartered the (First) Bank of the United States from 1791 to 1811 and the (Second) Bank of the United States from 1816 to 1836. Virtually all of these banks issued notes, and these notes circulated as currency. Thus, by the early 1800s, there were far more entities issuing currency in the United States than there had ever been before 1789. The regulation of these currency issuers varied from place to place and from time to time.
We have argued elsewhere (Rolnick, Smith, and Weber, 1994) that the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to make the United States a monetary union or a uniform currency area. If this is correct, then their goal was not achieved before the passage of the National Banking Act in 1863. Before this Act, most banknotes circulated against each other and against specie at discounts or premia that varied across time and space. The United States did not have a uniform currency.
Why did the initial attempt to provide the United States with a uniform currency fail? Our answer is that the regulation of banknote issues was flawed. In our view, and under conditions we describe, a necessary and sufficient condition for the achievement of a uniform currency with private currency issuers is that holders of currency can costlessly redeem private notes for outside money at par on demand. The basic idea is that when a currency can be costlessly redeemed for outside money at par on demand, it becomes a perfect substitute for outside money and will, therefore, trade at a fixed exchange rate with that currency. When all private currencies satisfy this condition, they will all trade at a fixed rate with outside money and, as a result, at par with each other.
At no time in the antebellum United States did bank regulation provide adequately for par redemption on demand that was costless to the holders of banknotes. Par redemption was not guaranteed. Banks could go out of business without sufficient assets to pay off note liabilities. Further, general suspensions of specie payments were, at various times, sanctioned by state governments. And even during periods in which banks generally were redeeming notes in specie, note holders had to bear costs in terms of time and effort in order to redeem their notes. As a result, banknotes circulated at something other than their face value.
The rest of this paper illustrates how important costless redemption of currencies at par on demand is for a uniform currency with private issuers to exist. Although such a situation never existed in the United States before the passage of the National Bank Act in 1863, we show that the size and regional variability of banknote discounts were smaller the closer this criterion was to being met. We also examine how other problems in achieving a common currency-like incentives to overissue notes-were affected by how close banknote redemption was to being costless.
Specifically, we examine two mechanisms used during the antebellum period that affected the redemption costs borne by the holders of banknotes. One is the Suffolk Banking System. This system for net clearing of banknotes existed in New England from the mid-1820s to the 1850s. It eliminated much of the cost to a bank of redeeming the notes of other banks. If our view is correct, the notes of the banks participating in the Suffolk Banking System should have behaved more like a common currency than did banknotes in other parts of the country at the same time. We show that this was the case.
Thus, although achieving a uniform currency was not a goal of the Suffolk Banking System, the System had the effect of providing a uniform currency in New England. We also argue that the design of the Suffolk Banking System included mechanisms that were sufficient to remove banks' incentives to overissue notes.
The other mechanism is the strategy for dealing with the notes of state banks used by the Second Bank of the United States from 1823 to 1836. This strategy was to immediately present to the issuing bank for redemption in specie all state banknotes it received. Despite the fact that the stated objective of this policy was to achieve a uniform currency, we argue that it did not provide much cost reduction for the holders of banknotes and, therefore, did not establish a uniform currency. We also have some reasons to doubt that this mechanism was adequate to control the potential for the overissue of notes.
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All of our discussion takes for granted that the achievement of a uniform currency was an objective-at least of the federal government-throughout U.S. history. We do not consider whether the achievement of a uniform currency should have been such an objective. Theoretical treatments do not necessarily suggest that the existence of discounts or premia-even fluctuating discounts or premia-on notes with the same face value are undesirable from a welfare perspective (Smith and Weber, 1999; Wallace, 2001) . And whether the antebellum United States constituted an optimal currency area is an open question (Rockoff, 2000; Bencivenga, Huybens, and Smith, 2001 ).
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1, we discuss in more detail our hypothesis that costless par redemption is required to achieve a uniform currency. In Section 2, we discuss the Suffolk Banking System. The Second Bank of the United States is discussed in Section 3. Interestingly, the experience of the Second Bank itself illustrates how a failure of a par redemption requirement for the issuer of a note provides incentives for note overissue. These incentives are discussed in Section 4. The final section concludes.
Achieving a uniform currency with private issuers
In this section, we consider an economy where notes issued by private agents coexist with a stock of outside money. We state three conditions that we think were satisfied in early U.S. monetary history. We then argue that, under these conditions, a necessary and sufficient condition for uniformity of the currency is that private notes be redeemable in outside money at par on demand, and that this redemption be costless to the holders of the notes. Throughout, what we mean by a uniform currency is that currencies of different issuers bearing the same denomination trade at par with each other and with whatever outside money is in circulation.
A. Three conditions for monetary exchange with private note issuers
We begin by considering an economy where monetary exchange is accomplished using a combination of outside money and a stock of privately issued banknotes. Three conditions were certainly satisfied in early U.S. monetary history and, we think, are likely to be satisfied in any economy with a similar set of monetary arrangements.
The first condition is that the private currencies in such a system are representative monies. That is, they are redeemable in some form of outside money with positive probability. Although par redemption with certainty was far from being the norm in the early United States, most banknotes could be redeemed for some positive amount of specie most of the time.
The second condition is that redemption inevitably involves some expenditure of time or resources on the part of the holder of the note, the issuer of the note, or both. Note holders might have to ship notes and specie as a part of the redemption process, and banks might have to install vaults to hold specie reserves and employ tellers to facilitate note redemption.
The third condition is that monetary arrangements require the use of both specie and banknotes. In addition, on certain occasions some agents must convert specie into banknotes and, conversely, banknotes into specie. It is, of course, plausible that banknotes could be used to supplement the use of specie: specie is relatively scarce and costly to use in transactions, and the use of commodity monies involved a wellunderstood opportunity cost. At the same time, other transactions-particularly payments for imports or payments of certain kinds of taxes-might well require specie. In addition, at various times, banks could face the need to redeem any notes that they received that were issued by other banks in order to augment their specie reserves. In summary, some agents are confronted with the necessity of regularly converting banknotes into specie and specie into banknotes. We now consider what is required for all currencies issued by different entities to circulate at par.
B. Necessary and sufficient conditions for uniformity of the currency
Under the conditions just stated, our assertion in this paper is that a necessary and sufficient condition for a uniform currency with private issuers is that note issuers redeem their notes at par on demand, with no cost to the holders of their notes. In other words, a uniform currency will be observed if and only if the holders of that currency can instantaneously get the par value of the currency without expending any resources. In particular, private currencies must be redeemable on demand with certainty, and holders of currency must experience no (or a minimal) time delay exchanging the private currency for the outside money at par. Stated slightly differently, our claim is that a uniform currency with private issuers will exist if and only if redemption is certain and redemption costs are borne entirely by note issuers (as was the case under the National Banking System) or by some other entity, such as the government. When the redemption costs are borne by the agents holding a currency and agents have a positive probability of having to make redemptions, then a currency will circulate at a discount against specie. Discounts on banknotes, which reflect these expected redemption costs for note holders, are required in order for banknotes and specie to have the same expected rates of return. Further, if redemption costs or probabilities vary by the location of the issuer, discounts at a given location can be different for different currencies.
In addition, the rates of exchange between banknotes of various issuers and between banknotes and specie can fluctuate for reasons unrelated to fundamentals, as long as these rates of exchange do not imply an arbitrage opportunity associated with purchasing and redeeming notes. This is essentially the gold points argument for why exchange rates between sovereign currencies can fluctuate under a commodity standard.
Because such discounts or premia can occur for reasons that are unrelated to fundamentals but can affect allocations and use resources, 4 they are inimical to a uniform currency system.
C. What limits private note issue?
When redemption at par is not required of the issuers of banknotes, then the uniformity of the currency can be threatened in another way. Suppose that the currencies of various private issuers (for example, banks, states, or countries) are treated as a uniform currency in the absence of a redemption requirement. Since the various currencies trade at par with each other, money holders will treat the various currencies as perfect substitutes. In this situation, any issuer of currency can collect seigniorage from the holders not only of its own liabilities, but of other liabilities as well.
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Further, the entity whose note circulation grows the most rapidly will, asymptotically, collect the bulk of the seigniorage generated within the monetary union.
This fact gives each issuer of a uniform currency a strong incentive to capture seigniorage by printing its notes at a rapid rate. We call this the seigniorage incentive problem.
Moreover, a failure to control this problem poses a sharp threat to the viability of a monetary union, because the resulting high rates of inflation can dilute or overturn the benefits of monetary unification. Additionally, when seigniorage incentive problems arise, currency issuers have incentives to take strategic actions to strengthen the demand for their own liabilities.
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Such actions are highly detrimental to the existence of a common currency area because they undermine its intention, which is to make all currencies perfectly substitutable.
Requiring redemption at par on demand offers a solution to the seigniorage incentive problem. When note issuers must redeem their liabilities on demand, they have no control over the quantity of their liabilities outstanding. While they can still raise seigniorage, they can take no strategic actions to enhance their seigniorage income. As a result, the seigniorage incentive problem disappears. However, if some currency issuers are not required to redeem on demand, perhaps because they operate under different regulations, then the seigniorage incentive problem remains.
D. Why wasn't note redemption costless?
Costless redemption at par on demand was far from being the norm in early U.S. bank regulation. The enforcement of the regulations against nonredemption and the penalties imposed for nonredemption varied from state to state and from time to time. For example, many states either did not require banks to redeem notes promptly, or they imposed only nominal penalties for failure to redeem notes on demand. According to 5 See Kareken and Wallace (1981) and Cooper and Kempf (2000) for a discussion of this point where different countries issue a nonredeemable currency. 6 A modern example of attempts to avoid immediate and costless liability redemption arises when agents try to arrange payments to earn float. This is a small instance of how strategic actions can be undertaken that allow issuers of liabilities to increase their earnings at the expense of other agents. 7 "In the earliest charters there was no express provision made for the redemption of notes, nor was there any penalty for nonredemption." And even when state laws or charters expressly required that banknotes be convertible into specie on demand, many states imposed no penalties for nonredemption. Relying once again on Dewey (1910, p. 76) : "With few exceptions previous to 1830 there were no penalties in southern charters for not redeeming notes. Banks were under no legal obligation to pay demands except by suit (our emphasis), and note holders were in the same position as other creditors."
Given the importance of note redemption, why did the states not insist on and enforce the prompt and certain redemption of banknotes on demand? While this question doubtless has many answers, an important consideration was certainly revenue. The
Constitution not only took away states' ability to print money, but it also eliminated several traditional sources of revenue (derived, for example, through the taxation of interstate commerce). Thus, we expect that the states would have attempted to raise revenue from their power to create note-issuing banks. Indeed, this source of revenue was rapidly exploited. In several instances, states took an ownership position in the banks they chartered; in several other instances, taxation of bank profits was a major source of state revenue. According to Sylla, Legler, and Wallis (1987) , from 1796 to 1800, Pennsylvania collected 43 percent of its total revenue from its banks. Furthermore, in a study of 15 states, the same authors report that from 1821 to 1825 (the first years for which data are available for all states) 7 states collected more than 20 percent of their total revenue from their banking systems. From 1831 to 1835, 10 states collected more than 20 percent and 6 states collected more than one-third of their revenue from their banking systems.
Thus, states could and did perceive strong incentives to allow banks to earn profits. If this revenue could be enhanced by taking a casual attitude toward note redemption-an attitude certainly taken by many states-the state would profit as a result. Additionally, if states took a more casual attitude toward note redemption in cyclical downturns than at other times-as they certainly did in practice-this would permit them to allow an expansion of the money stock, at least relative to what would 7 See also Huntington (1915, p. 33). 8 have occurred with note redemption in place. Thus, a desire to run countercyclical monetary policies would also give states incentives to take a relaxed attitude toward note redemption, at least at certain times.
Having said this, we think it is also important to observe that great importance was attached to the achievement of a uniform currency throughout the early history of the United States. Thus, to the extent that uniformity of the currency has value, the states in the early United States confronted a trade-off. They could raise revenue by taking a casual attitude toward the redemption of banknotes, but this damaged the uniformity of the currency. Thus, not surprisingly, not all states adopted an equally lax attitude toward note redemption. Moreover, our impression is that the federal government attached much greater importance to uniformity of the currency than did most of the states.
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In particular, the federal government was concerned about problems that might arise from collecting tax payments made in state banknotes that might go at a discount. Thus, attitudes toward note redemption might differ greatly at different levels of government.
However, for whatever reason, the enforcement of par redemption on demand-if not necessarily par redemption that was costless to the holder of the note-became more common as time passed throughout most of the United States.
The Suffolk Banking System 9
We now turn to an examination of the Suffolk Banking System to show how it effectively reduced to zero the redemption costs borne by the holders of banknotes.
Under our hypothesis, such a redemption mechanism should have caused the notes of the banks participating in this system to behave like a uniform currency. We show that this was the case, and that by the mid-1830s, a uniform currency area existed in New England.
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A. Its beginnings
On February 10, 1818, the Suffolk Bank became the seventh bank to be chartered in Boston. Within a year, it entered the note-brokering business-the buying and selling of country (non-Boston) banknotes, also known as foreign money. While the Suffolk Bank's note-brokering business was never profitable, it provided the testing ground for the development of a profitable, regionwide note-clearing system. By 1824, the Suffolk Bank had given up the note-brokering business and devised a new strategy for dealing with foreign money. The Suffolk Bank formed a coalition with the six other Boston banks. Members of the coalition pooled their resources at the Suffolk Bank in order to purchase and export country banknotes for redemption with the hope of ultimately eliminating these notes from circulation in the city of Boston. To that end, the Suffolk Bank would actively purchase, at the market discount, large quantities of foreign notes and send them back to the issuing country banks for redemption. These activities were nothing more than an attempt to increase the share of the Boston banks' notes in the total note circulation in Boston. However, the new note-purchasing strategy was unsuccessful in achieving this objective and was ultimately abandoned.
B. How the Suffolk System operated
In May of 1825, the coalition of Boston banks suggested that the Suffolk Bank begin a new note-clearing business. The Suffolk Bank would allow banks to deposit their foreign money with the Suffolk Bank. It would accept, at par, the notes of all country banks that chose to participate in this new arrangement. By 1826, the Boston banks had withdrawn from the original note-brokering coalition and become members of the new Suffolk Banking System (Suffolk Bank, 1826; Mullineaux, 1987, p. 890) .
For a New England bank to be a member of the Suffolk Banking System, it had to maintain a non-interest-bearing, permanent deposit with the Suffolk Bank: for each $100,000 of capital, a country bank had to hold $2,000 on deposit. A country bank also had to maintain an additional non-interest-bearing deposit that was, on average, sufficient to redeem its notes received by the Suffolk Banking System. Boston banks had to maintain only a non-interest-bearing, permanent deposit. This deposit was initially set at $30,000, but was gradually reduced to $5,000. The original deposit with the Suffolk Bank had to be in specie.
It should be noted that the Suffolk Bank did not require a country bank to be a member as a condition of receiving that bank's notes at par. The country bank was only required to have its notes redeemable at par at a Boston bank (Dewey, 1910, p. 87 ).
This new arrangement produced an important innovation. Banknotes were cleared, at par, by netting the accounts of member banks (Redlich, 1947, p. 74) . Before this time, no net-clearing system for banknotes had been established in the United States.
The netting of banknotes worked as follows: Each day, the notes deposited by participating banks at the Suffolk Bank were sorted. If a bank deposited more notes of other banks than the amount of its notes presented by other banks, then the bank received a credit to its account with the Suffolk Bank for the difference. In the opposite situation, the bank's account with Suffolk was debited for the difference. In computing these differences, the notes of all banks that were members of the Suffolk Banking System were valued identically at par. The actual debiting and crediting of accounts occurred on the day following that on which the notes were sorted. Once the posting to accounts was accomplished, the notes were returned to the issuing banks.
Notes of banks outside New England and notes of the few New England banks
that did not participate in the Suffolk System were also accepted by the Suffolk Bank.
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However, they were not accepted at par and were returned to the issuing bank for redemption as quickly as possible.
In its early stages, the note-clearing operations of the Suffolk System were relatively small. In the summer of 1824, the Suffolk Bank was receiving about $300,000 a month in country banknotes. This amount grew to $2 million a month by the end of 1825, and to well over $6 million a month by 1837 (Trivoli, 1979, pp. 15, 21) . To put these numbers in perspective, monthly clearing in 1825 amounted to approximately onehalf of the stock of notes in circulation in Massachusetts; by 1837, monthly clearing was close to the entire stock. And by 1837, virtually all the banks in New England were members of the Suffolk Banking System. The existence of the Suffolk Banking System reduced the cost of redemption to the holders of country banknotes. Now a New England bank did not have to take notes of other banks that it received in the normal course of business back to the issuing bank and then bear the cost of shipping back home the specie received. Instead, the Suffolk System gave a bank the option of depositing these notes at par in the Suffolk Bank (or another Boston bank). It could then forgo the shipping of specie since the deposit could be used to redeem its notes. Thus, the cost of note redemption for a note-holding bank was reduced essentially to zero. Under our hypothesis, the prediction is that the notes of New England banks that were members of the Suffolk System would go at par against each other.
Three pieces of evidence support the prediction of par circulation. The first is contemporary accounts, as in this passage from Dewey (1910, pp. 91-92) :
It [the Suffolk Banking System] was also an advantage to a merchant in the interior who wished to purchase merchandise in Boston, for he could carry with him country bank bills without resorting to specie or the purchase of a draft on Boston, for he knew that his bank bills were at par there (Merchants' Magazine, 1851, 24:79).
The second is the report of exchange rates for notes circulating in Hartford, Connecticut, May 16, 1838 (House Doc. 457) . The notes of all New England banks that were members of the Suffolk Banking System exchanged at par. By contrast, the notes of banks that were not members of Suffolk (at that time, these were almost all of the Rhode Island banks, 13 Maine banks, and roughly 17 other New England banks) circulated at a discount, with discounts ranging from 1 percent to 55 percent.
The third is the discounts on banknotes reported in the Van Court's Counterfeit
Detector, and Bank Note List. This monthly publication contained the discounts on the notes of banks from all states in the country in terms of notes of Philadelphia banks. Data are available for February 1839 through December 1858, a period of 239 months.
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In all 12 These discounts were originally collected in electronic form by Gary Gorton. They have been corrected and amended by Warren Weber and are available at http://minneapolisfed.org/research/economists/ wewproj.html. but 16 months, the modal discounts on the notes of banks in New England, with the exception of Rhode Island, were identical.
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Since the notes were treated as having the same value in terms of Philadelphia notes, we infer that they were going at par against each other in New England.
14 No other region of the country had such uniformity of modal discounts over this period. In fact, in states such as New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, discounts varied by the part of the state in which banks were located.
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According to our arguments, it is also important that the Suffolk System evolved mechanisms for controlling the seigniorage incentive problem. This was done in two ways. First, obviously, the Suffolk System required that member banks redeem notes at par on demand. But, second, Suffolk System members were required to maintain a noninterest-bearing deposit with the Suffolk Bank (or another Boston bank) adequate, on average, to redeem their notes received by the Suffolk Bank. If, at the margin, an additional dollar of note issue led to an additional dollar of note redemption, then every additional dollar of notes issued required that an additional dollar be held in a noninterest-bearing Suffolk Bank account. In this case, at the margin, the issue of additional notes did not generate additional seigniorage for the issuing bank. Smith and Weber (1999) argue that this was also important in ensuring that the notes of Suffolk System members would circulate at par.
The Second Bank of the United States
We now turn to an examination of the Second Bank of the United States. One objective of this institution was to provide the country with a uniform currency. We discuss the mechanism that the Second Bank used to attempt to achieve this objective and 13 The exceptions were October and November 1839, January through May 1851, May through November 1854, and March and April 1855.
14 There is some evidence that the currency in New England was not completely uniform, however. Clapp, Fuller & Browne's Bank Note Reporter, and Counterfeit Detector for July 1858 reports discounts on New England country banknotes of 1/10 percent, whereas the notes of Boston banks were trading at par. Despite this observation, we think the conclusion of par circulation is generally correct for this period. 15 While the design of the Suffolk Banking System was not duplicated elsewhere in the United States, mechanisms were developed in other regions for reducing the cost of note redemption. In New York state, country banks were required to have redemption agents in New York or Albany (Redlich, 1947) . Fenstermaker (1965, p. 84) suggests that similar mechanisms evolved in parts of Virginia. Weber (2001) also presents evidence that many country banks had arrangements with banks in financial centers to have their notes redeemed at par in those centers which, again, reduced the redemption costs to note holders.
argue that it did not produce much, if any, reduction in the cost of redemption to note holders. We then present evidence that a uniform currency was not achieved by the actions of the Second Bank.
A. Banknote discounts before the Second Bank
The Bank of North America in Philadelphia was the first bank chartered by a state after the United States achieved independence from England. It was chartered in 1782.
Shortly thereafter other states also chartered banks, and by the early 1800s banks existed in all of the states. Virtually every one of these banks issued banknotes which were, at least nominally, convertible into specie on demand. Although we do not have explicit data, we believe that banknotes circulated outside the local area at discounts and premia against the notes of local banks and circulated at a discount against specie everywhere. Some evidence on this is presented in Figure 1 , where we plot the discounts on notes of banks in various states in terms of notes of Philadelphia banks. The figure clearly shows that the United States did not have a uniform currency in any meaningful sense.
From 1815 through 1817, the notes of Baltimore banks were at between a 2 percent and a 6 percent discount. During 1816 and 1817, the discounts on the notes of North Carolina and District of Columbia banks were between 2 percent and 8 percent. There is also evidence that the notes of banks in Ohio were running at a 6 percent to an 8 percent discount during this period.
The figure also shows that the notes of Boston banks were at a substantial premium, sometimes as high as 17 percent, against Philadelphia banknotes in Philadelphia during this time. The reason is that Boston banks had not suspended specie payments, whereas Philadelphia banks had. The premia on Boston banknotes was roughly the same as the premium on specie in Philadelphia, as would be expected.
In 1816, the federal government chartered the Second Bank of the United States, in large part in the hope that the existence of such a bank would promote the resumption of specie convertibility by the state banks. This bank had a capital of $35 million, more than 10 times larger than the capital of any other bank in existence at the time. Of this $35 million, the federal government subscribed $7 million; individuals purchased the rest. The Second Bank had its headquarters in Philadelphia. Initially, it had 19 branches; ultimately it had 27 branches and 2 agencies. These were located in all parts of the country.
Although the Second Bank was unable to require state banks to resume specie payments, it eventually offered enough financial incentives so that by February 20, 1817, state banks voluntarily resumed specie convertibility (Catterall, 1902, pp. 24-25) . The effect is shown dramatically in Figure 1 . After February 1817, the discounts on Baltimore, District of Columbia, and North Carolina banknotes fell to 1-1/2 percent or less. Note that the premium on Boston notes also decreased. Thus, the resumption of convertibility moved the country much closer to a uniform currency.
The resumption of convertibility did not last long, however. In 1819, a suspension of convertibility of state banknotes became general in the United States (outside of New England), as the country experienced its first bank panic.
From 1819 through much of 1821, except for those in New England, the state banks were not even nominally redeeming their notes for specie. As a result, as is apparent from Figures 2 through 5, discounts increased on the notes of most state banks in Philadelphia. These discounts also varied widely by location. Notes of Maryland banks outside of Baltimore went at discounts that were from 1 percent to 3 percent higher than banks in that city. The notes of North Carolina banks went at discounts as high as 16 percent, whereas discounts on the notes of South Carolina banks never exceeded 8 percent, and discounts on the notes of Virginia banks never exceeded 5 percent. Further, the discount on the notes of a particular state's banks could vary widely over time (witness the three southern states in Figures 3 and 4) . Thus, this period illustrates how the total relaxation of the enforcement of par redemption led to currencies being much less uniform.
In view of the removal of any checks associated with the necessity of redeeming notes, it is not surprising that the issues of some state banks expanded dramatically.
Indeed, the desires of several states for seigniorage manifested themselves in the establishment of wholly state-owned, nonspecie-paying, note-issuing banks in Alabama, Kentucky, Illinois, Missouri, and Tennessee. In addition, some states, such as Michigan, issued scrip. In several of these states, laws were passed to force people to hold state banknotes-and to take them at rates in excess of their market value. This is a manifestation of a seigniorage incentive problem: states were taking strategic actions in order to enhance their own seigniorage income.
The most dramatic example of this occurred in Kentucky. Before 1819, Kentucky had relatively lax bank regulation. In 1817-18, state banks were authorized to redeem their notes with Bank of Kentucky notes, rather than specie, and for the Bank of Kentucky and its 13 branches, none was required to take the notes of another (Duke, 1895, pp. 16-17) . 16 In November 1820, the state chartered the wholly state-owned Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. This bank did not redeem its notes in specie.
Moreover, the notes of this bank were given several advantages in transactions. For example, the state had passed a law imposing on creditors a mandatory stay of one year if the creditor accepted Bank of Kentucky notes at par, and a two-year stay otherwise.
When the Bank of the Commonwealth was created, creditors accepting its notes at par faced only a three-month stay (Rothbard, 1962, p. 53) . The notes of this bank soon were depreciated 50 percent relative to specie (and even more in Philadelphia), and this situation persisted for some time.
In Illinois, another wholly state-owned bank was created and was authorized to issue $300,000. "The bank notes were backed by a stay law, delaying all executions for three years unless the creditor agreed to receive the state bank notes. Thus, the state did its best to place the notes on as close to a legal tender basis as constitutionally seemed possible" (Rothbard, 1962, p. 83) . The bank's notes depreciated rapidly, and Rothbard (1962) reports that they ceased to circulate by the end of 1823.
In Alabama, "the legislature refused to abide by the existing law which forbade accepting notes of non-specie paying banks in taxes. . . . The Alabama legislature went further and issued Treasury notes payable in the depreciating currency of the Huntsville Bank. Under the government umbrella, the Huntsville Bank issued large quantities of notes, which sank to a 25-50 percent discount" (Rothbard, 1962, p. 58) . In 1823, Alabama chartered a state-owned, note-issuing bank as well.
In Tennessee, a state-owned bank was created in 1819, and a stay law was passed providing that "when a bank was the creditor and refused to accept at par . . . either its own notes or the notes of the two leading banks in Tennessee, the execution would be stayed for two years" (Rothbard, 1962, p. 48) . In Missouri, the state established a loan office and a "supplementary stay law, which gave the creditor the choice of accepting two-thirds of the appraised value of the property in loan-office certificates at par or suffer a two-and-one-half-year stay" (Rothbard, 1962, p. 45) .
In short, an absence of note redemption led both to widely varying discounts and premia on notes and to a serious seigniorage incentive problem. Moreover, the situation of several states issuing their own notes (here indirectly through state-owned banks) and using legislative interference with contracts to enforce their circulation and enhance their value replicated, in certain respects, the experience of the United States under the Articles of Confederation. It was this exact set of circumstances which had resulted in the Constitutional prohibition of currency issues by the states in the first place.
B. Biddle's banknote redemption policy
In January 1823, Nicholas Biddle succeeded Langdon Cheves as president of the Second Bank. By this time, the banks of many, but by no means all, of the states had resumed the redemption of their notes in specie.
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Even so, substantial discounts remained on the notes of the banks of many states (see Figures 2-5 ) since, as we have argued, requiring note holders to bear the costs of redemption allows discounts to be observed. 17 South Carolina banks did not resume specie convertibility until 1823. In several western states, resumption also failed to occur until well after 1821.
Biddle sought to reduce discounts on the notes of state banks in order to achieve the desired objective of having a uniform currency. To attempt to accomplish this, he changed the policy of his predecessor with regard to the notes of state banks. During Cheves' presidency, the Second Bank paid out state banknotes whenever possible in its own lending operations and to its own depositors. Biddle reversed this policy; the bank paid out its own notes whenever possible. Indeed, even deposits made in state banknotes were repaid using Second Bank notes.
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The state banknotes the Second Bank received in the normal course of business were presented to their issuers for redemption as soon as possible.
It seems plausible that Biddle's policy was a method for reducing the effective costs of note redemption perceived by most holders of state banknotes. Instead of having to return a state banknote to the issuing bank, a holder could deposit it with a Second Bank branch and obtain a Second Bank note that was more widely and easily redeemable at par. 19 However, a critical question is whether the Second Bank was accepting state banknotes at par or at a discount. In other words, the question is whether the Second Bank was acting like the Suffolk Bank or was acting like a note broker. If the former, then under our hypothesis its policy should have provided the country with a uniform currency. If the latter, state banknotes would have gone at discounts.
We have no direct evidence on how the Second Bank behaved with regard to the state banknotes presented to it. We know that the Second Bank was required to accept the notes of specie-paying banks at par from the federal government and for purchases of federal lands. However, we doubt that most branches did this for state banknotes presented for deposit or loan repayment. That is, we think that the Second Bank acted like a note broker rather than like the Suffolk Bank.
We have two reasons for thinking this way: One is that it is well known that many branches of the Second Bank did not even accept the notes of other Second Bank branches at par (see below). From August 28, 1818, until July 1824, each branch was forbidden to redeem any notes but its own. Day's for December 2, 1834, has all of the notes of the Second Bank and its branches going at par. Given this evidence about how the Second Bank treated notes of its own branches, that it was indiscriminately taking state banknotes at par seems unlikely.
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The other reason we think that the Second Bank acted more like a note broker than like the Suffolk Bank is this: Suppose that the Second Bank took state banknotes at par and then presented them for redemption. Then it, rather than the issuing bank, would have been bearing the major portion of the cost of redemption of state banknotes. Given that the Second Bank was in business to maximize the profits of its shareholders, not the profits of the owners of state banks, it seems unlikely that it would have enacted such a policy.
Given that the Second Bank acted like a note broker, under our hypothesis Biddle's policy should not have reduced the discounts on state banks notes below what they were when this policy was not in effect. At first glance, the evidence appears to contradict this view. The discounts plotted in Figures 2-5 show a general tendency to be lower after 1823 than in the period before 1823. However, a closer examination of the evidence indicates that the reduction in discounts was (almost) entirely due to the fact that banks in the states shown in these figures had resumed specie payments. Biddle's policy of acting like a nationwide note broker had no effect, as our hypothesis would suggest.
Specifically, a closer inspection of the evidence indicates that in many cases, the level of discounts after 1823 was not below discount levels during 1817 and 1818 when banks were also paying specie for their banknotes. For example, during 1817 and 1818, South Carolina banknotes were at about a 2 percent to a 4 percent discount (see Figure 3) .
After 1824, they were at discounts in about the same range. North Carolina notes were also at about a 2 percent to a 4 percent discount in 1817 and 1818; after 1824, these discounts were more in the 3 percent to 5 percent range. The discounts on the notes of Baltimore banks were also higher after 1823 than during the 1817-18 period (see Figure   2 ).
Further, although the discounts on the notes of Maryland banks outside Baltimore were lower after 1823 than during the 1817-18 period (again, see Figure 2 ), the timing of the reduction is off. The decline occurred in 1821, two years before Biddle's policy was put into place.
That leaves the evidence from Virginia (Figure 4 ) and Kentucky ( Figure 5 ) as possibly refuting our hypothesis. Yet, Virginia is problematic because we have no discounts from 1817 and 1818 to use for comparison. And it can be argued that the reduction in the discounts on Kentucky banknotes was due more to changes in Kentucky banking than to Biddle's policy.
Other evidence against the view that Biddle's policy effected a more uniform currency is the discounts on banknotes in the 1840s and 1850s after the Second Bank lost its charter and ceased to exist. Monthly discounts on banknotes in Philadelphia for 6 and 7. The mean discounts from 1823 to 1832, the period when Biddle's policy was in effect, with those after 1843, when banks resumed after the Panic of 1837, are given in Table 1 . The evidence in the figures and the table shows that, with the exception of Virginia, discounts on banknotes were lower in the 1840s and 1850s than under the Biddle policy. Of course, this observation could be explained by improvements in transportation and communication that reduced the costs of note redemption. However, it is also consistent with our view that the reduction in discounts after Biddle's policy went into effect was due to the fact that most banks resumed specie payments at or before that time. The question arises: Why, given that one of its objectives was to provide a uniform currency, did the Second Bank not set up a system of redemption accounts for state banks along the lines of that established by the Suffolk Bank? One answer may be that it would not have been technically feasible given the large number of banks and the widespread counterfeiting of banknotes during this period. However, we think another answer is that Biddle wanted the Second Bank to be a creditor to other banks, rather than a debtor. A Suffolk-type system requires the bank running it to be a debtor to other banks.
Finally, we think that the lack of fully centralized control over the Second Bank branches should not be discounted. We expand on this lack of control in the next section.
A seigniorage incentive problem within the Second Bank
We have already seen the seigniorage incentive problem-the problem of overissuing notes and taking strategic actions to enhance their circulation-manifest itself during a period of general suspension of note convertibility. However, this problem can be even more extreme in a context where many entities are issuing notes that are fully intended to be perfect substitutes. Indeed, the seigniorage incentive problem arose in a particularly significant way in the early history of the Second Bank, and addressing it became a central issue within the Bank itself. We now examine this problem and look at the two solutions that were implemented to control it.
The Second Bank was created with 19 branches. Each of these branches issued notes of the Second Bank, so that the bank itself was an example of a multiple-issuer system, with all issuers printing the same currency. Until August 1818, all notes-issued by any branch-were nominally redeemable at par at any other branch of the bank.
However, patterns of funds flows imply that notes issued by southern and western branches were primarily redeemed in the north and east. Thus, without an adequate scheme for controlling note issue by an individual branch, the Second Bank should have been subject to an internal seigniorage incentive problem in the sense that one branch bank was able to extract revenue from other branches through note issue.
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In fact, this problem proved to be severe.
Why did the Second Bank have branches? The primary reason is that as a fiscal agent for the federal government, the bank needed to be able to collect and disburse funds in disparate regions and to be able to engage in interregional funds transfers. The existence of a branch system also would have facilitated the bank as a mechanism for creating a uniform currency. The existence of branches enabled the Second Bank to collect the notes of a wide variety of state banks and present them for redemption in a timely manner at a lower cost than without branches.
In its early incarnation, there was relatively little control over the individual branches. The first president of the bank, William Jones, was opposed to assigning a specific amount of capital to each (or any) branch (Catterall, 1902, p. 380) . Nor were there any mechanisms put in place for settling accounts between different branches of the Second Bank (Catterall, 1902, p. 30) . In addition, branch practices might not be known by the president. For example, in 1817, the Lexington branch of the bank sold its own notes at a premium of 1-1/2 percent and paid out the notes of local banks in its other transactions. Schur (1960, p. 123) suggests that this practice was unknown to Jones until
October of that year. This state of affairs led the bank's second president, Langdon Cheves, to write, "I am perfectly satisfied that with the present organization of the Bank it can never be managed well. We have too many branches, and the directors are frequently governed by individual and local interests . . ." (Catterall, 1902, p. 381, footnote 4) . Moreover, while both Cheves and Biddle regarded the lending operations of western branches as unprofitable, under Jones, several branches explicitly ignored directions from Philadelphia to curtail their lending (Catterall, 1902, pp. 52-54) . This is perhaps not surprising in view of the fact that branch directors were often significant borrowers (Catterall, 1902, p. 101) .
In a system of this type, the branch(es) with the fastest growing note issues could collect resources from the rest of the banks. Those branches were primarily located in the south and west, as well as in Baltimore, where the branch directors were engaged in active fraud. In June 1818, the Cincinnati branch made over $1,800,000 in loans, while the branch at Lexington loaned $1,619,000 (Catterall, 1902, p. 34) .
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The result was that "the entire capital of the institution was rapidly being shifted to the South and West. Out of the total capital stock of $35,000,000 the office at Baltimore held $5,646,000 in May 1819; Richmond, $1,760,000; Savannah, $1,420,000, and Charleston, $1,935,000 . . . .
Lexington had $1,502,000, Louisville, $1,129,000, and Cincinnati $2,400,000, while New York had a capital of $245,000, and Boston had none whatever" (Catterall, 1902, pp. 55-56) .
In response to this state of affairs, Jones ordered discounts reduced by $5 million throughout the Second Bank. This was actually accomplished, but in a way that illustrates the lack of centralized control over the western branches. Those "offices, instead of diminishing, increased their loans to the extent of $500,000" (Catterall, 1902, p. 54) . As a result, Philadelphia, New York, and Boston were forced to curtail loan activity; New
York and Boston had not been assigned any loan reductions.
In principal, there should have been a mechanism in place to check these activities of the offending branches; their notes could have been presented for redemption (at the branch of issue) by other branches of the bank (or by individuals). In practice, however, "the southern and western branches could not and did not furnish means for their redemption" (Catterall, 1902, p. 412) . To the extent these notes were redeemed anywhere, they were redeemed in the northeast.
The consequence of this lack of uniform regulation over the branches was that the southern and western branches faced no effective check on their ability to raise seigniorage. As they collected seigniorage from the rest of the Second Bank, they could use the resources acquired either for the benefit of the individual branch directors, as in Baltimore, 25 or for the benefit of their own regional economy at the expense of other regions.
Without any other means of controlling the seigniorage incentive problem, Jones acted to make the notes issued by the various branches imperfect substitutes: on August 28, 1818, each branch was forbidden to redeem any notes but its own.
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We have already seen what this implied about discounts on the notes of various branches. As a result, from
August 1818 on, the Second Bank did not even issue an internally uniform currency.
"Once more there was no common medium of exchange, and thus the first attempt to give the country a better currency through the agency of the Bank of the United States ended in failure" (Catterall, 1902, p. 405) . The seigniorage incentive problem had prevented even the Second Bank itself from acting as a true monetary union.
In 1819, Cheves replaced Jones as the president of the bank and in that year began to implement a new set of policies designed to control the seigniorage incentive problem within the Second Bank. However, this was done by nearly eliminating the note issues of the southern and western branches altogether. Indeed, while the bank resumed the redemption of its small denomination ($5) notes at branches other than the branch of issue, 27 and while Cheves took actions to restore central control of the bank's brancheseliminating one branch (Cincinnati) and preventing western branches from issuing any notes at all-"by January 1823, the active western offices issued only $45,820, and in December of the same year only $16,785-insignificant sums which hardly permit one to speak of western issues" (Catterall, 1902, p. 411) . This certainly was another means of controlling the seigniorage incentive problem that existed within the bank, but it had the 25 See the discussion in Catterall (1902, pp. 42-48) .
26 Except in payment of debts owed to the federal government.
27 Notes in this denomination constituted about one-sixth of the bank's outstanding note issue.
consequence that large parts of the country were left with only the notes of state banks as currency. Outside of New England, state banks were not redeeming their notes at this time, often their notes were heavily discounted, and a seigniorage incentive problem of a different sort was disrupting the monetary system. Again the United States did not have a uniform currency.
When Nicholas Biddle became the president of the Second Bank, he was determined to expand the note issues of the southern and western branches. This policy stood in marked contrast to Cheves'. Biddle's solution to the seigniorage incentive problem within the bank was similar in spirit to the mechanism of having notes be redeemable in specie on demand. The branches were to be allowed to issue notes, but they were to give up a large amount of discretion regarding the volume of their own notes outstanding. The specific mechanism employed was that the branches were allowed to use their own notes to purchase so-called inland bills of exchange. According to Catterall (1902, p. 406) , "By the buying of bills when notes were issued, a fund was provided out of which the notes were paid when they were presented at the Atlantic offices. In this way the danger of having the bank's capital shifted to the West and South was avoided."
Thus, in particular, the branches were permitted to issue notes, but only in a way that created a fund allowing for their redemption.
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By maintaining this redemption, the Second Bank branches lost the power to take strategic actions to enhance their own seigniorage income. Biddle also took several actions to increase the degree of centralized control over the operations of the individual branches (Catterall, 1902, pp. 102-4) .
Evidently, these policies still allowed the southern and western branches to substantially expand their note issues without threatening the rest of the bank. In Clearly, while note issues by the bank expanded dramatically in all regions, issues by 28 The bills of exchange purchased by the branches "were to be drawn on New Orleans or the Atlantic cities . . . so that they might come to maturity and be paid at these places simultaneously with the notes" (Catterall, 1902, p. 115) . Thus, redemption was not only possible, but fairly automatic "provided the bills of exchange were promptly paid" (Catterall, 1902, p. 115). branches in the south and west represented a larger proportion of the expansion (Catterall, 1902, p. 408) .
Obviously, the corporate governance of the Second Bank was severely flawed. Its internal organization allowed various branches to issue claims which were-in many instances-paid off by other branches of the bank. Not surprisingly, this permitted such claims to be overissued. Nonetheless, the main point remains: When notes were not redeemed by certain issuing branches, they were issued in relatively large quantities. The insistence on note redemption by issuing branches-as under Biddle's policy regarding the use of inland bills of exchange-did quite a bit to control the Second Bank's internal seigniorage incentive problem.
Conclusions
A comparison of the operation of the Suffolk Banking System with the activities of the Second Bank of the United States suggests several conclusions. First, the attainment of a genuine monetary union with multiple issuers of currency can be guaranteed only if notes are costlessly redeemable at par on demand. In the Suffolk System, the costs of note redemption were effectively transferred to the issuers of notes, who paid the costs of operation of the Suffolk System. Under the Second Bank, the costs of note redemption were never fully transferred away from note holders on a national basis. The Suffolk Banking System came much closer to providing a uniform currency than did the system used by the Second Bank.
Second, the attainment of a successful monetary union with multiple currency issuers requires that these issuers not perceive incentives to overissue notes or to take strategic actions to expand their note circulation. Appropriate incentives in this regard
were not present in the early history of the Second Bank. They were provided under Cheves' presidency only by virtually eliminating the note issues of southern and western branches-hardly a state of affairs conducive to the existence of a uniform currency. In contrast, the Suffolk System provided at least two separate mechanisms-par redemption of notes on demand and the holding of non-interest-bearing centralized clearing balances-as a means of checking seigniorage incentive problems. The means devised by the Suffolk System for addressing the seigniorage incentive problem appear to have been highly successful.
With the lapse of its federal charter in 1836, the Second Bank ceased to operate on anything other than a local basis.
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The Suffolk System continued in operation until 1858. The uniformity of the currency in New England was preserved until that date. The rest of the United States never achieved a uniform currency until the passage of the National Banking Act in 1863. That act forced note issuers to bear redemption costs, as under the Suffolk System, and it solved the seigniorage incentive problem by making notes redeemable at par on demand.
We believe that these lessons from U.S. monetary history have broad current applicability in areas that are now in the process of establishing monetary unions. Part of the problem in attaining a uniform currency in the United States before the Civil War was the lack of uniform bank regulation. As we have noted, individual states regulated the activities of banks, and these regulations were far from uniform in terms of requiring par redemption of notes on demand. Even within the Second Bank, branches did not operate in a uniform way or under uniform regulation.
In the current constitution of the European Monetary Union, for instance, bank regulation is being left to the individual member nations. This allows for the possibility that national governments will manipulate regulations in a way that allows seigniorage incentive problems to arise. Alternatively, as more entities-nonbanks as well as banksissue currency-like liabilities (possibly in the form of e-cash) in the United States under the aegis of different regulatory institutions, the same possibility arises. In our view, this suggests the importance of the lessons learned in the early United States with respect to the formation of a monetary union.
Of course, there have been a number of attempts in other places at other times to establish a monetary union.
30
It would be interesting to do a systematic study of the extent to which costless convertibility of currencies was maintained in such attempts, and of the extent to which this costless convertibility was correlated with the success of the monetary union. 29 The Second Bank operated under a state of Pennsylvania charter until 1841. See Holdsworth (1928) . 30 See Bordo and Jonung (2000) for a number of descriptions. 
